Walter Gómez1, Jorge Dresdner∗,2 y Miguel Jara2.
1.Universidad de La Frontera
2.Universidad de Concepción
This paper analyzes the distributional consequences of re-distributing quota between different artisanal fisher groups (from large vessel to small vessel owners) when management is based on a collective rights system. We develop a basic model to analyze an organization’s optimal decisions with a collective fishing rights system. With this model as a conceptual framework, using a Theil index as a distributive measure, and employing optimization techniques we calculate this index for different assignment and distribution rules within the organization: centralized efficient quota assignment, de- centralized quota assignment with and without transferability, individual quotas, and initial allocation based on historical assignments (with no transferability). The empirical model is based on data from the common sardine and anchovies artisanal fisheries of south central Chile and it is used to analyze an actual experience of quota re-distribution between artisanal fishers. Based on the results we discuss and compare the equity and efficiency implications of these different assignment and distri- butional rules.
Keywords: Collective rights; quota re-distribution; artisanal fisheries; Theil index.
Participación en sesión: Recursos naturales y desarrollo local.