Descargar
AUTORES
Carlos A. Chávez1, Jim Murphy2 y John K. Stranlund3.
1. Universidad de Talca, cchavez@utalca.cl.
2. University of Alaska.
3. University of Massachusetts-Amherst.
Participación en sesión: Recursos naturales y desarrollo local.
Resumen
This work presents the results of an economic field experiment designed to study behavioral issues related to both the protection of a common-pool resource from poaching by outsiders, and the problem of managing a local common resource within a group under the presence of outsiders when enforcement is imperfect and costly. We have two specific objectives. First, to study the ability of group members to manage the resource in the presence of poaching. Second, to study different methods for the “insiders” to monitor the resource and impose sanctions. In all cases, monitoring is imperfect (i.e., there is a chance that poaching will not be detected). Enforcement treatments in our experiment include: i) relying on an external agency to provide enforcement; and ii) allowing insiders to share the responsibility of monitoring the resource at a personal cost.
Keywords: Common pool resources; economic experiments; enforcement; poachers; territorial use rights fisheries.