César Salazar1 y Jorge Dresdner2.
Share contracts are the dominant remuneration system in artisanal fisheries. The introduction of regulations based on collective use rights may affect the way how revenues are distributed between labor and capital. However, the empirical literature of the effect of regulatory reform on factor income distribution is scarce. In this paper, we exploit differences in timing in the implementation of the Artisanal Extractive Regime (RAE) in the Chilean hake artisanal fisheries to explore the effect of use rights-based regulations on share contracts. We estimate a switching regression model using census data to compute the average treatment effect (ATE). Our results suggest that crew profit shares are 10 % larger in fishing communities with RAE compared to those without RAE. Differences in the relation between crew size and labor rewards under different regimes seem to be driving this result.
Keywords: share contracts; fisheries; collective use rights; switching regression model.
Participación en sesión: Recursos naturales y desarrollo local.